Using a growth theory perspective, this paper summarizes the recent advances on the bidirectional links between emigration and development. Taken at face value, the stylized facts suggest that (i) helping poor countries to develop can relax credit constraints and lead to massive migration pressures, and (ii) increasing migration can spur the brain drain and increase global inequality. In terms of policy coherence, this means that development policies could reduce the e¤ectiveness of restrictive immigration policies. Recent studies challenge these views. In this paper, I use a Migration Accounting model to show that credit constraints, while relevant for the very poorest countries, only have a limited e¤ect on the upward segment of the migration transition curve. I then use a Development Accounting model to show that emigration, albeit skill-biased, is likely to generate positive e¤ects on income per capita in most low-income and middle-income countries. Hence, should there be an inconsistency between policy actions, it is of a di¤erent nature: for most developing countries, migration barriers jeopardize the e¤ectiveness of development and cooperation policies.
Introduction
The relationship between emigration and development has been abundantly studied by economists and social scientists for the last 50 years or so. Causality between Background paper prepared for the policy day on the "Migration and Development -Looking back on a decade of research" organized in June 2017 by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). I thank the AFD for its …nancial support. Correspondence: frederic.docquier@uclouvain.be. these variables runs in both directions: development a¤ects emigration, and emigration a¤ects development. Nonetheless, these bidirectional links have mostly been studied separately, and the earlier debates on the Emigration-Development nexus have been in ‡uenced by two major stylized facts. First, we observe an inverted-U shaped relationship between emigration rates and economic development in crosssectional data, usually referred to as the migration transition curve (Zelinsky, 1971; de Haas 2007 de Haas , 2010a de Haas , 2010b Clemens, 2014; Dao et al., 2018) . Economic development thus seems to produce additional emigration from origin countries with income per capita levels below $5,000 to $6,000. Second, well-educated people exhibit much greater propensity to emigrate than the less educated, and tend to agglomerate in countries/regions with high rewards to skill (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Kerr et al., 2016) . Positive selection is due to migrants' self-selection (high-skilled people being more responsive to economic opportunities and political conditions abroad, having more transferable skills, having greater ability to gather information or …nance emigration costs, etc.), and to the skill-selective immigration policies conducted in the major destination countries. Positive selection decreases with economic development. In low-income countries, the ratio of emigration rates between college graduates and the less educated is around 20 (in high-income countries, this ratio is around 1.2). Emigration thus seems to reduce human capital accumulation and the growth potential of poor countries Taken at face value, these two stylized facts suggest that development and migration policies should be conducted in an integrated manner. As far as development policies are concerned, the fear is that helping poor countries to develop can generate massive migration pressures (In 2010, approximately two thirds of the world population lived in countries where income per capita was smaller than $6,000), something considered as undesirable by the host-country citizens/voters, if one believes the opinion poll surveys. As for immigration policies, increasing migration may spur the brain drain and slow down the accumulation of human capital in poor countries, with harmful implications for development, global inequality and extreme poverty.
Using a growth theory perspective, this paper summarizes the recent advances on the interplay between emigration, development, and human capital accumulation. Recent studies challenge the views that development policies generate large migration pressures, or that increasing emigration is harmful for economic development. Regarding the e¤ect of development on emigration, I propose a Migration Accounting method to disentangle the main drivers of the migration transition curve. The most common explanation of the increasing segment of this curve is the existence of credit constraints preventing potential migrants in poorer countries from realizing their aspirations. Building on a recent companion paper (Dao et al., 2018) , I provide evidence that credit constraints, while highly relevant for the very poorest countries, only have a limited e¤ect on the upward segment of the migration transition curve. As far as policy implications are concerned, the results suggest that in the short run (i.e., for a given skill structure and for a given set of macroeconomic determinants), a rise in income induces small e¤ects on low-skilled (and average) emigration rates. In the long-run, a rise in income increases the proportion of more mobile high-skilled workers but reduces population growth. Hence, economic development has uncertain long-run e¤ect on the emigration stock: the increasing mobility of workers can be o¤set by smaller population levels.
As for the e¤ect of emigration on development, I use a Development Accounting model à la Jones (2014) to identify the causal e¤ect of emigration on the level of income per capita in the origin country. I start from the traditional view, which highlights the detrimental e¤ect of (skill-biased) emigration on labor productivity and economic growth. Then, I account for three feedback mechanisms investigated in the recent literature: (i) migrants'remittances, (ii) the e¤ect of emigration prospects on the expected return to human capital and on ex-ante education decisions (i.e., before deciding whether to emigrate or stay put), and (iii) the potential for migrants to reduce international transaction costs and facilitate the ‡ows of goods, factors, and knowledge between host and home countries (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) . Overall, accounting for these feedback e¤ects, the quantitative analysis reveals that emigration, albeit skill-biased, is likely to generate positive e¤ects on income per capita in most low-income and middle-income countries.
In short, the existence of bidirectional links between emigration and economic development potentially jeopardizes the e¤ectiveness and coherence of separate policy actions. In particular, most high-income countries spend a fraction of their GDP to promote economic growth in the developing world and, at the same time, conduct increasingly restrictive (or selective) immigration policies to reduce migration in ‡ows. In this context, the fear is that development policies can reduce the e¤ectiveness of immigration barriers. Recent studies support a di¤erent view. Should there be an inconsistency between policy actions, it is of a di¤erent nature: for most developing countries, migration barriers are likely to reduce the e¤ectiveness of development and cooperation policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 combines recent databases to describe migration trends by education level over the period 1990-2010. Section 3 summarizes the competing theories that are hypothesized to explain the observed inverted-U relationship between development and emigration, and to assess the role of …nancial constraints. Section 4 discusses the causal impact of the size and skill structure of emigration on development. Section 5 concludes. In order to obtain the emigration rates, I have to proxy the size and structure of the native population. For this purpose, I combine data on the population aged 25 years and above, with data on the share of college-educated individuals from di¤erent data sources. The skill-speci…c emigration rates (m Table 1 provides aggregate emigration stocks and skill-speci…c emigration rates for the years 1990, 2000, 2010 by income group, by country size and by region. It shows that high-skilled emigration rates strongly decrease with economic development and population size. On the contrary, low-skilled emigration rates increase with economic development. In low-income countries and by the year 2010, college-educated individuals were 18 times more migratory than the less educated. The skilled emigration rates were 20 and 30 times greater than the low-skilled emigration rates in the previous decades (i.e., in the years 2000 and 1990, respectively). In high-income countries, college graduates only migrate 1.2 times more than the less educated. This means that international migrants from poor countries strongly self-select along the skill dimension.
As far as country size is concerned, emigration rates are about …ve times larger in small countries (less than 2.5 million inhabitants) compared with large countries (more than 25 million inhabitants) in all skill groups. Hence, regions with the greatest skilled emigration rates include small and poor countries (e.g., Caribbean and Paci…c islands). Overall, skilled emigration rates decreased between 1990 and 2010 in all groups. Exceptions are Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia and South-Central Asia. The worldwide average emigration rate has been pretty stable for the last 20 years, which is due to the increasing demographic share of low-income countries (the group exhibiting the greatest emigration rates). On the contrary, low-skilled emigration rates increased in virtually all groups. Note. Tab. 1 focuses on emigration to OECD destination countries only. For income groups and regions, I use the World Bank classi…cation. For country size, I distinguish between countries with population above 25 millions (High-pop), between 10 and 25 millions (Upper-middle), between 2.5 and 10 millions (Lower-middle), and below 2.5 millions (Low-pop).
How does development a¤ect emigration?
Starting with Zelinsky (1971) , a …rst strand of literature focuses on the e¤ect of development on emigration. Traditional neoclassical models of migration posit that narrowing wage gaps between country pairs monotonically reduce migration along speci…c corridors. In reality, we instead observe an inverted-U shaped relationship between migration and development in cross-sectional data, most commonly referred to as the migration transition curve. Hence, economic development seems to produce additional emigration from origin countries in early stages of development (see de Haas 2007 de Haas , 2010a de Haas , 2010b .
To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows the relationship between average emigration rates (m i ) and the level of income per capita (y i ) in the origin country. The results are obtained using the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimation (see Epanechnikov, 1969) . I consider a sample of 123 countries, excluding small states with populations below 2.5 million inhabitants, as well as those experiencing episodes of con ‡ict. Using the database described in Section 2, I construct measures of migration ‡ow intensity to OECD member states -which host about 50% of the worldwide adult migrant stock (Artuç et al. 2015) -over the 2000-2010 period. I only consider migrants aged 25 and above (as a proxy for the working-age population). For each origin country, the net emigration ‡ow is proxied as the di¤erence between the emigrant stocks in 2010 and 2000; it is then divided by the size of the native population in 2000. In line with Clemens (2014), Figure 1 shows that increase with economic development up to a level of income per capita (y) around $6,000 and decrease thereafter. As income per capita increases from $600 to $6,000, the average emigration rate increases from 1% to 4%. As income per capita increases from $6,000 to $60,000, the average emigration rate decreases from 4% to 2%.
Various explanations of the observed relationship have been conjectured in speci…c contexts, the most common being the existence of credit constraints preventing potential migrants in poorer countries from realizing their aspirations. Taken at face value therefore, the migration transition curve suggests that further global economic development will result in massive volumes of international migration from the poorest regions of the world. Indeed, by the year 2010, approximately two thirds of the world population lived in countries with income per capita levels below $6,000. If the average emigration rate of these countries increased by 1 percentage point, an additional migrant ‡ow of 0.66% of the world population would move from developing to OECD countries (representing 1/6 of the world population). Consequently, the average immigration rates of the OECD member states would increase by more than 4 percentage points. Is this an inevitable consequence of development policies?
To address this question, I propose a Migration Accounting method to evaluate the competing theories that are hypothesized to underpin the upward segment of the observed inverted-U relationship. In particular, the goal is to assess whether …nancial constraints are instrumental to explaining the upward segment the migration transition curve. I proceed in three steps, as described in Dao First, I use the same data sources as above to construct skill-speci…c measures of migration intensity for the 2000-2010 period. I distinguish between migrants with college education (denoted by h and referred to as the highly skilled) and those with lower levels of education (denoted by l and referred to as the low-skilled). By construction, the average emigration rate of a sending country i is de…ned as:
where m s i denotes the average emigration rate of group s, and h N i denotes the proportion of college graduates in the native population aged 25 and over. It follows that:
The skill composition of the native population varies with economic development, possibly re ‡ecting the existence of credit constraints that go beyond the capacity of individuals to …nance migration costs. The share of college graduates in the native population h N rises constantly with development (see Figure 3 .a below). It is 20 times larger in the richest relative to the poorest countries. In addition, migration rates are always greater among college graduates (m h ) than among the less educated (m l ). At low levels of income per capita, positive selection is strong (m h ' 30m l ) in the very poorest countries. In the richest countries, positive selection is much weaker. Hence, education levels, taken in isolation (i.e., looking at the …rst term of the derivative), likely prove crucial in understanding the foundations of the migration transition curve. In addition, the other hypothesized drivers are likely to a¤ect the mobility of low-skilled and high-skilled individuals di¤erently (i.e. looking at the second and third terms of the derivative). Overall, the college-educated emigration rates m h decrease with development, while those of the less-educated m l follow an inverted U-shaped and ‡atter relationship (see Figure 3 .e below).
Second, I use regressions to identify the fractions of dm s dy that are due to microeconomic drivers (i.e., …nancial incentives and constraints) and to macroeconomic drivers. Regressions are conducted at the dyadic level. The set of macroeconomic drivers is a vector X ij that includes socio-demographic variables, gravity determinants and existing migrant networks from any origin country i to any destination country j. Having controlled for macroeconomic drivers (i.e., all the relevant, originspeci…c mechanisms identi…ed in the existing literature), I assume the residual e¤ect of income to reasonably provide an upper-bound for the e¤ect of microeconomic drivers. Using a quadratic function of income per capita (in logs), microeconomic drivers can induce non-monotonic e¤ects on skill-speci…c emigration rates. The regression model can be written as: m Regression results for actual migration rates are presented in Table 1 . The standard errors are clustered by country of origin. Columns (L1) and (H1) include the full set of controls and the log of income per capita (linear speci…cation). Columns (L2) and (H2) add the squared level of the log of income per capita (quadratic speci…cation). Finally, columns (L3) and (H3) represent my parsimonious speci…cations comprising signi…cant controls only, in addition to the log level of income. I run a horse race between several competing theories underpinning the migration transition curve. Hence, my parsimonious speci…cations are obtained after running backward stepwise regressions starting from the most complete model. The parsimonious model is used to minimize concerns of collinearity. It explains 60.5% of the overall variation in low-skilled migration rates. The only signi…cant variables are network size, the log of income per capita and its square. A rise in income increases the low-skilled emigration rate when income per capita is below $1,400. Above this level, low-skilled emigration decreases with development. This con…rms that …nancial constraints are likely to limit the capacity of less educated people to emigrate in low-income countries. The parsimonious model rather explains 45.2% of the overall variability in high-skilled emigration rates. On the one hand, the high-skilled emigration rate increases with network size, linguistic proximity, colonial links and genetic distance. On the other hand, it decreases with contiguity and with income per capita. The results are robust to alternative speci…cations and regression techniques (see Dao et al., 2018) .
Third, to illustrate the role of microeconomic drivers and compare it with that of the Skill Composition component and that of macroeconomic drivers, the derivative of the migration transition can be rewritten as:
which allows identifying four components of the migration transition curve: the skill composition one, the e¤ect of …nancial incentives and constraints for high-skilled and low-skilled individuals, and the role of macroeconomic drivers.
Figures 2 describes the results of the decomposition of the total slope (the bold curve). It typically shows that the Skill Composition explains approximately one fourth of the positive slope of the migration transition curve at levels of income per capita below $1,000 or else between $4,000 and $6,000. In addition, a large portion of the curve can be explained by the macroeconomic drivers (in particular, the gravity and network e¤ects). The HS Micro component is always nil or negative, since the high-skilled emigration rate always decreases with development. The size of this component is limited at low levels of development however since h N i is small. As far as …nancial constraints are concerned, the LS Micro component e¤ect is larger than that of the Skill Composition for origin countries below $1,000 (note that countries below $1,000 accounted for less than 5% of the world population in the year 2010). For origin countries between $1,000 and $6,000 however (i.e., in countries accounting for more than 60% of the world population in the year 2010), the Skill Composition e¤ect exceeds that of the LS Micro.
This implies that …nancial constraints, while relevant for the very poorest countries, only have a limited e¤ect on the upward segment of the migration transition curve. As far as policy implications are concerned, our results suggest that in the short run (i.e., for a given skill structure and for a given set of macroeconomic determinants, O), a rise in income induces small e¤ects on low-skilled and average emigration rates. In the long-run, a rise in income increases h N (i.e., increasing the number of more mobile high-skilled workers) and a¤ects O (e.g., lower population growth), which increases the share of college graduates among emigrants as well as the average emigration rate. Nevertheless, economic growth has an uncertain e¤ect on the emigration stock, since increasing the mobility of workers can be o¤set by smaller populations. Overall, this implies that the risk of a massive emigration response to economic development is limited, both in the short-run and in the long-run. The macroeconometric literature failed identifying large causal e¤ects of human capital on economic growth. However, these studies su¤er from inextricable identi…ca-tion problems. Greater e¤ects are identi…ed when using parameterized Development Accounting models, even in the absence of technological externalities (Jones, 2014) . In this paper, I follow this approach and construct a Development Accounting model to estimate the e¤ect of (skill-biased) emigration on income per capita under the traditional and recent views. My model is calibrated using the average country characteristics observed at each level of economic development (as proxied by the observed level of income per capita). These characteristics are depicted in Figure 3 for the year 2010. 3.e. Emig rates by skill group 3.f. Remittance-to-GDP ratio Figure 3 .a shows the increasing relationship between income per capita (in logs) and the share of college graduates in the labor force; the education data are described in Section 2. Figure 3 .b shows the decreasing relationship between income per capita and the ratio of earnings between college graduates and the less educated; data on returns to skills are taken from Hendriks (2004) . Figure 3 .c shows the inverted-U shaped relationship between income per capita and the average emigration rate, as depicted on Figure 1 . Figure 3 .d shows the decreasing relationship between income per capita and the ratio of emigration rates between college graduates and the less educated; the migration data are described in Section 2. Figure 3 .e shows the relationship between income per capita and skill-speci…c emigration rates, as extracted from Eq. (1). Figure 3 .f shows the decreasing relationship between income per capita and the ratio of remittance in ‡ows to GDP; data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017).
Insights from a minimalist model
The labor market and growth literatures have shown that a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production framework explains well the disparities in macroeconomic performance between countries and the patterns of wage inequality between skill groups. In the CES framework, a rise in human capital mechanically increases the average income because highly educated workers are more productive than the less educated.
The CES technology below determines the average level of income per capita (y i ) and skill-speci…c wage rates (w s i ) in country i as a function of the structure of the resident population:
where h L i stands for the proportion of college graduates in the resident labor force, A i denotes the total factor productivity (TFP), i is relative productivity parameters capturing the skill bias in production.
The production technology can be calibrated to match the patterns of income per capita and wage inequality depicted on Figure 3 . In line with the labor market literature (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Angrist, 1995), the elasticity of substitution ( ) between college-educated and less educated workers varies between 1.5 and 3. When is …xed, can be calibrated to match wage inequality levels (w 
; from which we can extract h 
It is straightforward to show that h On average, emigration reduces the proportion of college graduates by 0.2 percentage points at a level of income per capita around $1,000 (from 1.2 to 1.0%), by 0.3 percentage points at a level of income around $2,000 (from 1.8 to 1.5%), and by 0.4 percentage points at a level of income around $6,000 (from 3.4 to 3.0%). In absolute terms, skill-biased emigration has limited e¤ects on the share of college graduates in the labor force. As positive selection decreases with economic development, the e¤ect gets smaller for higher level of income.
For given i and A i (i.e., in the absence of technological externality) and for given h 
A negative results means that emigration reduces the level of income per capita.
The predictions of the minimalist model are depicted in Figure 4 . The dotted curve shows how the income e¤ect due to (skill-biased) emigration varies with the observed level of development, y i . As emigrants are always positively selected, i is negative for all levels of development. In the poorest countries of the world (i.e., countries with y i below $6,000), the income loss amounts to 1% of the potential nomigration income level (the loss is even slightly smaller than 1%). Due to smaller selection, the e¤ect gets smaller at higher level of income. Hence, small development e¤ects are obtained in this minimalist model. 
Pessimistic model with schooling externalities
Greater contributions of human capital to productivity can be obtained by assuming technological externalities. In the same CES framework, I now assume two schooling externalities, an aggregate productivity externality and directed technical changes:
Eq. (5) formalizes a simple Lucas-type, aggregate externality (see Lucas, 1988 ) and assumes that the scale of the total productivity factor (TFP) is a concave function of the skill-ratio in the resident labor force. This externality captures the fact that college-educated workers facilitate innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies (see Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994 Figure 3 , the correlation between the calibrated TFP level and the skill ratio is equal to 0.89, and the elasticity is close to 0.4. Given the bidirectional causation relationship between productivity/income and education decisions, I consider this elasticity as an upper bound for the aggregate externality. For illustrative purpose, I assume that half the correlation is due to the technological externality (i.e., = 0:2).
In Eq. (6), the skill-biased technical change a¤ects the relative productivity of high-skilled workers (see Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013) . For example, Autor et al. (2003) show that computerization is associated with declining relative industry demand for routine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative demand for non-routine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college versus non-college labor. When comparing low-income, middle-income and high-income countries, skill-biased technical changes also capture the transition from agriculture to nonagriculture, or from the traditional to the modern sector (see Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009; Volrath, 2009; Gollin et al., 2014) . In logs, the correlation between the calibrated skill bias and the skill ratio is equal to 0.91, and the elasticity is close to 0.2. Given the bidirectional causation relationship between the skill bias and education decisions, I consider this elasticity as an upper bound for the skill-bias externality. Again, I assume that half the correlation is due to the skill-bias externality (i.e., = 0:1).
The bold curve in Figure 4 shows how the income e¤ect due to emigration varies with the observed level of development when schooling externalities are factored in. In the poorest countries of the world (i.e., countries with y i below $6,000), the income loss is around 4% (four times greater than without externalities). The e¤ect gets gradually smaller in countries where income per capita exceed $6,000. This is the most pessimistic assessment of the economic cost of (skill-biased) emigration.
Optimistic model with compensating mechanisms
Can these income losses be o¤set by other mechanisms? This is the question which has received the most attention for the last ten years or so. Recent studies dealing with the development impact of emigration account for indirect feedback e¤ects. The most important ones are remittances, endogenous education decisions, and diaspora externalities (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) . Starting from the most pessimistic view (i.e., the model with schooling externalities), I add these compensating mechanisms into the Development Accounting framework. The augmented income e¤ects are depicted in Figure 5 .
Adding remittances. -The less disputable compensating mechanism is the remittance channel. On average, recorded remittances represent 3% of GDP in low-income countries. This is a rather conservative estimate as o¢ cial data are likely to underestimate the actual level of remittances. Figure 3 .f shows that the ratio of o¢ cial remittances to GDP rapidly decreases with income per capita. Remittances reallocate income from donors to recipient countries, and may attenuate or fully compensate the income loss due to skill-biased emigration as shown in di Giovanni et al. (2015) .
Starting from the pessimistic model with schooling externalities (bold curve), the long-dash curve on Figure 5 shows that remittances almost fully o¤est the domestic income loss in the poorest countries of the world (where income per capita is below $1,000). The income loss is roughly divided by two in countries around $4,000. The e¤ect of remittances decreases as domestic income gets larger. This is because the ratio of remittances to GDP decreases with economic development (see Figure 3 .f). Vidal (1998) and Beine et al. (2001) , the link between skill-biased emigration rates and pre-migration human capital formation has been theoretically investigated in the recent literature. Skill-biased emigration prospects are shown to raise the expected return to human capital, thus inducing more people to invest (or people to invest more) in education at home before deciding whether to emigrate or stay put. Macro-level evidence of the same relationship can be found in the literature. Beine et al. (2008) estimate that a doubling of a country's emigration rate of highly-skilled workers is associated with a 5% increase in the stock of human capital possessed by its nationals (including emigrants) within a decade. Their …ndings suggest that under certain conditions the stimulus to skill formation may be strong enough to bring the economy's stock of human capital to a higher level in the post-migration equilibrium. Micro-level evidence of a positive impact of emigration on the net stock of human capital in the source country has been provided in many studies. These in- Starting from the model with schooling externalities and remittances, the middledash curve on Figure 5 shows the income response to emigration with endogenous education. I assume that h 
The choice of this linear speci…cation for the last term ensures that the TFP level remains positive when m i = 0. The elasticity of productivity to the proportion of emigrants is thus given by m=(1 + m). I calibrate in such a way that this elasticity is equal to 0.03 when the proportion of migrants abroad equals 3% (i.e., the world average level); this gives = 0:62. Starting from the model with schooling externalities, remittances and endogenous education decisions, the short-dash curve on Figure 5 represents the income response to emigration with diaspora externalities. The income gain from emigration now reaches 3% in the poorest countries of the world, whereas the e¤ect becomes positive in middle-income countries around $6,000 (countries with the largest diasporas abroad, relatively to their population). On average, the income gain equals 2% in richer countries.
Concluding remarks
This paper summarizes the recent progress of the literature on the links between emigration and development, and quanti…es its main …ndings. Firstly, I develop a Migration Accounting model to disentangle the main drivers of the migration transition curve. The model reveals that credit constraints, while relevant for the very poorest countries, only have a limited e¤ect on the upward segment of the migration transition curve. This suggests that the risk of a massive emigration response to economic development is limited. Secondly, I develop a Development Accounting model to quantify the e¤ect of emigration on the level of income per capita in the origin country. The model reveals that emigration, albeit skill-biased, is likely to generate positive e¤ects on income per capita in low-income and middle-income countries. Still, the e¤ect is small in the majority of countries, which is due to the fact that average emigration rates are low. My estimates are likely to be conservative. It is possible that standard growth theory underestimates the size of the development impact of emigration. This is because it disregards potential mechanisms such as transfers of behavioral norms (fertility, education, gender-egalitarian, culture, etc.) or political remittances (in ‡uence of diasporas on the number of voters and on political preferences). Accounting for these e¤ects in a quantitative framework is a challenging task.
The complex links between emigration and development might pose a problem of coherence for development and migration policies. However, should there be an inconsistency between policy actions, it is not the one expected from earlier literature (i.e., development policies jeopardizing the e¤ectiveness of restrictive immigration policies). On the contrary, we may fear that migration barriers reduce the e¤ectiveness of development and cooperation policies.
